Showing posts with label Democratization. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Democratization. Show all posts

Wednesday, September 19, 2012

The Issue of Human Rights

The present constitution of Indonesia contains several chapters on human rights. Equal treatment before the law, non-discrimination among citizens, the right to have jobs and education, freedom of association and expression, and freedom of religion are all mentioned in the constitution. But in practice, some straying from these ideals have occurred. As many Asian countries, Indonesian takes the view that human rights should be interpreted locally and that the country should not follow the Western interpretation of it blindly (Budiardjo 1991). Promotion and protection of these rights must be conducted in a way that balances individual and collective rights, with individual rights being second to collective rights. 

However, the problem arises about the meaning of collective rights and who has the authority to determine whether a right is individual or collective. This has often generated disagreement between the community and the government. For example, when the government needs land for urban development, the bureaucracy always employs the principle of public interest to “force” the people out of their land or to determine the compensation price for land at low level, despite the fact that in many cases the land bought is then given to private companies to develop housing complexes or supermarkets. When conflicts arise between the government and the “forced” sellers of land, the court often sides with the government. 

In terms of labour relations, workers still have difficulties in protecting their interests. The state tends to over-protect industrialists so as to boost exports, leaving workers to protest for wage hikes and to demand their right to set up unions. 

Wages in Indonesia are considered one of the lowest in Asia (Werner International Management Consultant 1990). In 1992, the minimum wage set by the government for Jakarta was Rp 3000 (U$ 1.5) per day, while in other areas it was Rp 1,250 (U$0.50) per day. These wage levels are not sufficient to sustain the minimum human need. The situation gets worse when many industrialists fail to pay their labourers even the mininmum wage level. According to the Labour Minister, in Jakarta about 3 percent of industrialists do not pay the minimum level of wages (Tempo, 19 February 1994). The industrialists also tend to use child labour or refuse to give pregnancy leave for women workers (Tempo, 25 September 1993). 

To fight for their rights, workers have only one organization (SPSI, the All Indonesian Labour Federations) which is recognized by the government. Any effort to establish other labour organizations is quashed. This can be seen in the move made, for example, by Haji Princen to set up the Independent Labour Union Setiakawan (Tempo, 1991), and by Mochtar Pakpahan to establish the Indonesian Labour Welfare Union, both of which were blocked by the government. 

Worse still, there is a stipulation in law which says that workers who want to set up unions must obtain agreement from the management of industries or factories where they are working. In fact, not many owners allow their workers to set up labour organizations. In addition, strikes by workers and lay-offs by employers are prohibited (Budiman 1992). The Department of Labour is also actively involved in labour disputes, having the right to invite involvement by the military. In many cases, the military has taken over problems and handled the disputes in a way that has tended to protect the interest of the industrialists more than that of the workers. 

The prohibition of workers from setting up organizations has a historical basis. During the Old Order period (1950-65), labour organizations had been used by political parties, especially the Communist Party to mobilize workers against the government. Labour unrests were a major cause of political instability that inflicted great damage on the economy and contributed to the fall of the Old Order.

(Continued on title : "The President")

Tuesday, September 18, 2012

Political Parties

The New Order Government inherited the state’s traumatic experience with political parties and this has strongly affected its attitude towards such parties. In the 1950s, the government was under parliamentary system which suffered badly from political instability, which included regional rebellions. In that period of “Liberal Democracy” (1950-59), Indonesia had about fifty parties competing with one another on the basis of ethnicity and primordialism. No Cabinet lasted for more than six months because of the absence of a majority party. There was also suspicion in the regions that the centre had too much power in their hands, leaving only limited autonomy to the regions. Furthermore, the rapid development of the Communist Party caused anxiety among other parties and the majority of army leaders at the regional and local levels. These two factors, among others, were behind the regional rebellions during 1957-60 in West Sumatra and Sulawesi. 

When Soeharto took office in 1966, his attitude towards the role of political parties was a reflection of the earlier political trauma. The victory of Golkar (which is strongly supported by the military) in the 1971 elections (the first elections held in the New Order era) put the government in a good position to propose new political regulations. In 1973, the government reduced the number of political parties from ten to three through amalgamation. Some Islamic-based parties were grouped into the PPP while the nationalist, Christians and Catholics were grouped into the PDI. 

Soon, it became clear that forced regrouping like this would create serious internal conflicts among the parties. The traditional Muslim groups have always been in conflict with the modernist Muslims in the PPP, while the nationalists have always failed to come to agreement with the Christians and the Catholics in the PDI. Internal conflicts have also occurred in PPP and PDI party conferences, and this has usually invited the intervention of the government. The frequent conflicts have become a factor in the failure of the parties to consolidate or strengthen their organizations, while the government has steadily accumulated power through its party machinery, Golkar. 

Most parties have become very dependent on the government for several reasons. For example, financially, the parties would not be able to conduct party congresses or election campaigns without massive aid from the government. Thus, the government has easily dictated policies to the parties and exerted much influence on leadership selection within the parties. There is little chance for the parties to select their own leaders without the agreement of the government. 

The PPP and PDI have had difficult times in trying to raise funds from businessmen because their election prospects are uncertain. The public are unsure of the benefit they can obtain from their donations to the parties. Intellectuals also have the same question in mind when they are approached by the parties. Support for Golkar on the other hand is ample because it has the ability to provide facilities and protection to businessmen and even positions in the government for intellectuals who support it. 

As noted earlier, since 1987 there have been changes in the attitude of businessmen and intellectuals. Some of them have begun to support, and get involved in, the management of the PPP and the PDI with the aim of defeating Golkar in the cause of democracy. However, their numbers are still small and it is likely they will not grow significantly in size by the time of the next elections in 1997.

(Continued on title : "The Issue of Human Rights")

Monday, September 17, 2012

The Parliament


Today in Indonesia, political institutions are not free from government intervention. Although some changes have occurred over the last decade, politics and policy remain the monopoly of the highest levels of the civilian and military bureaucracies (Jackson 1980). The role of the legislative body (DPR or Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) is limited although there is some improvement compared to the 1970s.

Since the 1971 elections, Golkar has held the majority of seats in the DPR, leaving the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or United Development Party) and the PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia or Indonesian Democratic Party) as minority parties. Political domination by Golkar is strengthened by the presence of Members of Parliament (MPs) who have been appointed by the government: they are from functional or professional groups, with military officers accounting for about one-third of the total number of MPs (about 400 MPs).

Furthermore, since 1971, the electoral system has been marked by a multi-member constituency or proportional system in combination with a list system. Enforcement of this system has caused the alienation of MPs from their constituencies. Under this system, MP candidacies are determined by the Council of Party Leaders (DPP) of each political party. As such, some MPs may merely have access to or connections with the DPP and may not be familiar with their constituencies. Many MPs have no knowledge about their constituencies since they live in Jakarta or originally came from some regions but represent other regions. A candidate from West Java, for example, may represent East Java although he has never lived in East Java at all.

As a result, not many MPs actually possess the requisites to become representatives of the public. To remain in office they merely need support from the party councils and not from the constituencies. Thus, their position in the DPR is not dependent on public support but on support from the party councils. On the basis of this fact, they tend to support party policies rather than the aspirations of the public. The dominant position of party councils is strengthened by the fact that the councils have the power to recall MPs from their positions in the DPR if they violate party discipline or if the councils receive a warning from the government.

The mechanism and procedures in the DPR also place limitations on MPs in proposing new laws. A proposal needs the agreement of two factions before it can be an agenda item for discussion. In fact, it is difficult for minority parties such as the PPP and the PDI to get the agreement of other parties, especially from Golkar as the majority party. This arrangement reduces the possibility of opposition in the DPR.

As noted earlier, there have been changes in the attitudes of MPs over the last decade. They have been more vocal in criticizing the government. The Bapindo (Bank Pembangunan Indonesia, or Indonesia Development Bank) financial scandal, for example, was discussed in 1994 as a result of investigations by an MP from Golkar. But such MPs are few in number and come mainly from either the military faction or from Golkar. The majority of the MPs still prefer to keep silent to avoid being recalled by their party councils. In addition, for many younger MPs, especially from Golkar, their seats in Parliament guarantee them a good life for at least five years. In research on the performance of MPs was the need to have job (Santoso 1993). Thus, it is easily understood why in many parliamentary debates MPs prefer to keep silent.

(Continued on title : "Political Parties")

Sunday, September 16, 2012

Press Freedom


As stated above, the mass media in Indonesia have been allowed more freedom but some limitations remain. The government, for example, has the authority to ban any mass media if its news or analysis has, according to the government, undermined the credibility of the government or threaten the stability and security of the country. Since 1970, some media have been closed down; the last occurred in magazines (Tempo and Editor) and one tabloid (Detik). Such power is reinforced by the fact that the Indonesian presses have to seek permission from the government for any publication. Additionally, the government has to approve the composition of the editorial board before letters of permission are issued.

The government’s closure of the three publications mentioned above met with protests from students. Yet, the protests lasted only a week and people quickly forgot about the issue. The editors of the publications were left with the view that they had to exercise self-censorship. Such self-censorship is also occasioned by a stipulation in the press laws that “the national press has [both] the freedom as well as responsibility”. The final say on press freedom and its responsibility lies, of course, with the government.

Another factor behind the ban of the three publications was an intra-elite conflict involving three parties: the Muslims, the Nationalist, and the Catholics. The three publications were closed down after they continually wrote about Indonesia’s acquisition of warships from Germany which, according to them was too expensive. The three publications also reported that the key figure behind the acquisition was Minister for Research and Technology, B.J. Habibie, a minister who is strongly affiliated to the Muslim group through position as Chairman of ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia or Association of Muslim Intellectuals).

Reports on the warships were considered conspiratorial, aimed at undermining the reputation and political influence of Habibie as well as the Muslim groups by the mass media sponsored by the nationalist. Although the chief editors of Tempo (Gunawan Muhammad and Fikri Jufri) were not connected to the nationalist groups, they were categorized (by their opponents) as nominal Muslims. Some members of the editorial board of the magazine, however, were considered nationalists and they were believed to have written the articles about Habibie. The Chief Editor of Detik tabloid was also considered by his opponents as a nationalist. Criticisms of Habibie were also made by the mass media owned by Christian, and specifically Catholic groups.

Prior to the closing down of these publications, President Soeharto on his visit to Lampung (in south Sumatra) had explained that all accusations made by the media about Habibie were wrong because the decision to buy the warships was made b him and that Habibie did not know about it. The President claimed that he had given Habibie instructions to contact the German Government for the purchase of the ships. The President had heard about the possibility of buying the ships from a leading businessman close to him. In the speech in Lampung, the President indirectly asked the authorities to enforce sanctions on the media which were engaging in insinuations and spreading false information. The case of Tempo shows that the government still has much power over the press.

(Continued on title : "The Parliament")

Wednesday, September 5, 2012

The Politics of Openness


Since the mid-1980s, political participation has been allowed to increase through the process of so-called politik keterbukaan (political openness). The growth of the economy and improvement in the level of education of the people have impacted on the government’s political attitude. One of the results of economic and educational development has been the increase in public political awareness over the last twenty years. Demands for more participation have also been strengthened by international pressure, related to foreign aid when donor countries look closely at a recipient country’s record of democratization, human rights and environmental protection.

Meanwhile, the academic community has been given more freedom to criticize the government. Academics are allowed to voice their opinions and criticism on government policies in the mass media, a freedom they did not enjoy in the previous decade. Intellectuals and students have formed themselves into various discussion groups and regularly give feedback to the government and the bureaucracy. The press also enjoys more freedom as can be seen in their relatively liberal selection, analysis, and presentation of articles.

The government’s attitude towards opposition groups has also changed significantly. An opposition group known as Petisi 50 which for more than a decade was barred from holding meetings, visiting foreign countries and even engaging in business activities, was given a chance to reconcile itself with the government. Minister of Research and Technology B.J. Habibie took the initiative in arranging a meeting between President Soeharto and the top leader of Petisi 50, Retired General A.H. Nasution in the presidential palace. Habibie also invited another leader of Petisi, Ali Sadikin (former Governor of Jakarta) together with other leading figures of the group to visit PT. PAL (a dockyard company, which is part of the “eight strategic industries” advocated and nurtured by Habibie) in Surabaya. This was the first invitation given to Petisi members by a high official, and though remaining critical of the government, their criticisms have not been as sharp as was previously the case.

However, some people still doubt the intention of the government to democratize because, according to them, the government is not nurturing the tree of democracy. Some even suspect that the government has adopted a double standard. They argue that, on the one hand, the government allows the public to criticize the government but, on the other, it still maintains many restrictions. It is widely believed that whenever the government feels that critics have gone too far it will use force to limit freedom. The term “rubber-band” policy (Jakarta Post, 2 June 1994; Alfian 1991) clearly describes this approach.

It should be remembered that some opposition leaders remain prohibited from organizing or taking part in seminars or meeting unless they secure permission from the police. Thus far, the opposition has not challenged this illiberal measure in court. Summoning government officials to court is considered useless because in most cases the government wins.

(Continued on title : "Press Freedom")

The Growth of the Economy

It is difficult to deny that under the New Order significant economic progress has been made. A stated above, the New Order inherited from Soekarno an economic system characterized by spiralling inflation of up to 600 per cent in 1965 and a scarcity of goods and services. In the 1990s, however, Indonesia has experienced consistently high or at least moderate economic growth. Even in 1982, when Indonesia was hit by the step decline in international oil prices, its annual rate of economic growth was still above 2 per cent.

The New Order has also successfully reduced the incidence of poverty. In 1976, the proportion of poor throughout. Indonesia was 40.36 per cent of the total population, while in 1987 it was 17.44 per cent. According to the Central Bureau of Statistics, in 1990 it was further reduced to 14.33 per cent (Syahrir 1992, p. 26).

The increase of educational facilities and the growth in the number of students especially at the elementary school level has also been phenomenal. Facilities in public health have also improved. in every sub-district (kecamatan), the government has established a Community Health Centre (Puskesmas) led by a medical doctor under a programme called Inpres Doctor (under which a medical doctor must serve in sub-districts as compulsory public service for three years after graduation). In each village there is one Posyandu (Community Service Centre) which provides services, especially medical services, for villagers. The centre is led by village officials who, among other things, have the task of calling for a medical doctor from the sub-district.

The flow of information has also increased significantly under the New Order. There are now at least one or two newspapers in each province, and two or three private radio stations. In Jakarta itself, there are four television channels run by private companies, compared with two government television channels. In addition, the public is not prohibited from having parabola antennae to access world information network by satellite. Transportation has also connected villages and small towns and opened up remote areas. It is believed that many sub-district capitals that used to be small and isolated, have now become medium-sized towns with a relatively high rate of mobility for the population.

The Indonesian economy has been forced to adjust to international economic change. Rising global economic competition and difficulties in obtaining international loans have forced the government to change some of its economic policies. For example, in fiscal policy, the government has had to reschedule a number of large projects. Meanwhile, state-owned companies are now open to market competition, operating with smaller subsidies from the government. Foreign investors have been given more freedom to invest over longer time periods and without the need to have local partners. Even more significantly, the government has tried to mobilize tax revenues through a reformed tax law in the wake of a shortfall in oil revenues. Tax campaigns are often launched to ensure that liable companies and individuals pay tax. Every year, the government publishes lists of individuals and companies paying the largest amount of tax in order to encourage people to pay taxes.

Various changes have been made to monetary policy, one being to allow the private sector to establish banks. As a result, many private banks are now existence, many of them with connections to big businesses. International banking is also promoted in Indonesia. Similar changes have taken place in investment policy, where more openness to foreign investment has been initiated. Foreign investment previously faced several limitations, as enforced by so-called government regulation No. 20/1994. In 1994, however, the government allowed foreign companies to invest in Indonesia without time limitations. The changes in fiscal as well as monetary and investment policies have made the government more dependent on society which, in turn, means that the window to democratization is now opened.

(Continued on title : "The Politics of Openness")


Tuesday, September 4, 2012

The Case of Indonesia's New Order

Why has the process of democratization in Indonesia been so slow despite fast economic growth? What are some of the important factors that have accounted for this situation? This chapter attempts to answer these questions.

Indonesia under the New Order has had at least two periods of quasi-democracy. The first was during the early years of the New Order (1966-74), and the second commenced from 1988. In the period 1966-74, Indonesia experienced what a noted Indonesian journalist Mochtar Lubis called a blossoming of freedom (Kompas, 8 March 1992). Power was shared among various power centres, and freedom of the press and expression was allowed. However, this period ended when students from various universities in Jakarta started to protest against the goverment.

The first protest occurred in 1968 against the increase in the price of rice and resulted in the government regulating the price along with the establishment of logistics bodies (Bulog or Badan Urusan Logistik) to regulate the distribution of rice and some other basic commodities. The second protest involved student demonstrations in 1974 against visiting Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka on the role of Japanese investment in Indonesia and the rest of Asia. This protest was known as the Malari affair. All these protests were not handled by the government through participatory measures but by political engineering which tended to decrease public political participation (Mas'oed 1989; Muhaimin 1980; Sumitro1991; Budiman 1991).

 Learning from the above incidents, the government tightened its grip during the period 1975-88. Critics were no longer tolerated, and the press were forced not to publish any news considered by the government as dangerous and which would threaten political stability. This policy of reducing political participation was supported by some leading economists who viewed stability as crucial to economic development. During the regime of Soekarno, the economy was in dire straits and by 1965 inflation was spiralling to over 600 per cent. Some argue that such a situation occurred because of government policies that gave too much attention to politics.

The 1980s can be viewed as a period in the development of Indonesian politics under the New Order government. During this decade and beyond there were hopes for an acceleration of the democratic process since the government began to introduce what it called keterbukaan politik (political openness). However although political liberalization has been affected, some remain sceptical about how far it will go and whether democratization can be felt by the people in their daily lives? There are some who believe that the position of the state remains much stronger vis-a-vis society, although there have been much progress in social and economic conditions. If this is the case what factors are behind this situation? Or, why is the present state of Indonesia still categorized as semi-authoritarian in the midst of social and economic progress? To answer these questions, it will be necessary to describe the present economic and political situation.

(Continued on title : "The Growth of the Economy")
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