The Parliament

Today in Indonesia, political institutions are not free from government intervention. Although some changes have occurred over the last decade, politics and policy remain the monopoly of the highest levels of the civilian and military bureaucracies (Jackson 1980). The role of the legislative body (DPR or Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) is limited although there is some improvement compared to the 1970s.

Since the 1971 elections, Golkar has held the majority of seats in the DPR, leaving the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or United Development Party) and the PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia or Indonesian Democratic Party) as minority parties. Political domination by Golkar is strengthened by the presence of Members of Parliament (MPs) who have been appointed by the government: they are from functional or professional groups, with military officers accounting for about one-third of the total number of MPs (about 400 MPs).

Furthermore, since 1971, the electoral system has been marked by a multi-member constituency or proportional system in combination with a list system. Enforcement of this system has caused the alienation of MPs from their constituencies. Under this system, MP candidacies are determined by the Council of Party Leaders (DPP) of each political party. As such, some MPs may merely have access to or connections with the DPP and may not be familiar with their constituencies. Many MPs have no knowledge about their constituencies since they live in Jakarta or originally came from some regions but represent other regions. A candidate from West Java, for example, may represent East Java although he has never lived in East Java at all.

As a result, not many MPs actually possess the requisites to become representatives of the public. To remain in office they merely need support from the party councils and not from the constituencies. Thus, their position in the DPR is not dependent on public support but on support from the party councils. On the basis of this fact, they tend to support party policies rather than the aspirations of the public. The dominant position of party councils is strengthened by the fact that the councils have the power to recall MPs from their positions in the DPR if they violate party discipline or if the councils receive a warning from the government.

The mechanism and procedures in the DPR also place limitations on MPs in proposing new laws. A proposal needs the agreement of two factions before it can be an agenda item for discussion. In fact, it is difficult for minority parties such as the PPP and the PDI to get the agreement of other parties, especially from Golkar as the majority party. This arrangement reduces the possibility of opposition in the DPR.

As noted earlier, there have been changes in the attitudes of MPs over the last decade. They have been more vocal in criticizing the government. The Bapindo (Bank Pembangunan Indonesia, or Indonesia Development Bank) financial scandal, for example, was discussed in 1994 as a result of investigations by an MP from Golkar. But such MPs are few in number and come mainly from either the military faction or from Golkar. The majority of the MPs still prefer to keep silent to avoid being recalled by their party councils. In addition, for many younger MPs, especially from Golkar, their seats in Parliament guarantee them a good life for at least five years. In research on the performance of MPs was the need to have job (Santoso 1993). Thus, it is easily understood why in many parliamentary debates MPs prefer to keep silent.

(Continued on title : "Political Parties")